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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE: TRIAL OF ISSUES BY IMPLIED
CONSENT, NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE TO MUTUAL MIS-
TAKE. The case of Carpenter v. Hill seems to have had its incep-
tion in a comedy of errors.1 Plaintiff brought suit for rescission
of a contract for the exchange of land on the basis of mutual
mistake.
The contract provided for the exchange of a filling station
owned by plaintiff for defendant's peach orchard. Apparently Tn
good faith defendant informed plaintiff that the land was subject
to a mortgage, but that payments were to be made only out of one-
half each year's crop. Actually the entire balance fell due later in
that year. Before signing the contract plaintiff went to the bank
where the note and mortgage were in escrow and inquired as to
the balance due. He did not ask to see the note, although had he
done so, his belief in the wondrous crop payment arrangement
would have been shattered.
Some time after the completion of the exchange, plaintiff
learned the true facts about the payments. This suit for rescission
followed. Although defendant pleaded only a denial, the issue of
plaintiff's failure to pursue his investigation with due diligence
was brought out in the testimony without objection. The trial
court rendered judgment for the defendant on the theory that
plaintiff's negligence barred his recovery.
On appeal the Court said, "If negligence was a defense, de-
fendants were deprived thereof by failure to file an affirmative
pleading." Rule 8 (c) provides that any matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense must be affirmatively pleaded in
order to be available to the defendant.2 Clearly the decision was
correct in holding that the nature of negligence as a defense to
mutual mistake is such that it should be specially pleaded.
However, it is possible that the Court overlooked the effect of
Rule 15(b) which provides for trial of issues by implied consent.
The record in the case discloses that on direct examination of the
plaintiff's own witnesses the facts upon which the trial court based
its finding of negligence were established. On cross-examination
this aspect of the case was developed in detail; hence the rule in
question would seem to be applicable.
A long line of federal cases establishes the principle that under
this rule issues which are raised during the trial without objection
Carpenter v. Hill ... Colo ..... 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11, p. 379.
'Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, 8(c).
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are to be treated as though they had been pleaded.3 Of particular
interest is Swift & Co. v. Young which said that the doctrine of
last clear chance could be introduced in this manner. Likewise in
Rogers v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. the court ruled that a set-off could
be allowed when tried by implied consent saying, "That in itself
would require us to treat it as raised by the pleadings."
A number of Colorado cases following this same principle.
4
In the course of the dissent in Borga v. Hendrickson mention was
made of these results:
In construing our rule 15 (b) we have held that in
the absence of motions or objections any issue which the
parties see fit to present may be considered and determined
by the trial court and that the pleadings become functus
officio.
Another issue of interest in the instant case was raised by
the fact that the decision without any comment quoted section 508
of the Restatement of Contracts:
The negligent failure of a party to know or to dis-
cover the facts, as to which both parties are under a mis-
take does not preclude rescission or reformation on
account thereof.
The Colorado Annotation on this section contends that Colo-
rado disagree in theory, but agrees in result by a refusal to.
recognize negligence in cases of mutual mistake. Three cases are
cited in support of this proposition.,
Lloyd v. Lowe was an action by the mortgagee of property on
which defendant had unintentionally assumed the mortgage. The
case is not in point since it was not an action between the parties
to the contract, and the plaintiff was merely denied an unintended
windfall.
Hitchens v. Milner decided shortly thereafter cited Lloyd v.
Lowe as authority. The negligence alleged was failure to read
before signing a contract which the persons's attorney had pre-
pared. In view of the relationship of trust and confidence between
I Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, 15(b); Swift & Co. v. Young, 107 F. 2d
170 (4th Cir. 1939); Rogers v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 145 F. 2d 119 (9th Cir.
1944); Franklin v. Columbia Terminals Co., 150 F. 2d 667 (8th Cir. 1945); Scott
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 151 F. 2d 61 (3rd Cir. 1945); Continental Illinois
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Erhart, 127 F. 2d 341 (6th Cir. 1942).
4 Toy v. Rogers, 114 Colo. 432, 165 P. 2d 1017 (1946); Carlson v. Bain, 116
Colo. 526, 182 P. 2d 909 (1947) ; Scheller v. Mawson, 117 Colo. 201, 185 P. 2d
1009 (1947) ; Craft v. Stumpf. 115 Colo. 181, 170 P. 2d 779 (1946) ; Rose v. Roso,
119 Colo. 473, 204 P. 2d 1075 (1949); U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Bartges, 120 Colo. 317,
210 P. 2d 600 (1949); Rogers v. Funkhouser, 121 Colo. 13, 212 P. 2d 497 (1949);
Hopkins v. Underwood, 126 Colo. 224, 247 P. 2d 1000 (1952).
5 Borga v. Hendrickson, 120 Colo. 303, 209 P. 2d 543 (1949).
6Lloyd v. Lowe, 63 Colo. 288, 165 P. 609 (1917); Hitchens v. Milner Land,
Coal and Townsite Co., 65 Colo. 597, 178 P. 575 (1919); Home Insurance Co. v.
Gaines, 74 Colo. 62, 218 P. 907 (1923).
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attorney and client it may well be true that there was no negli-
gence.
Home Insurance Company v. Gaines was a case in which the
defense presented to the court was laches rather than negligence.
In addition each of the these cases is distinguishable from the
instant case by the fact that no independent investigation was
undertaken and left half-finished. More in point is an early case
in which plaintiff sought to rescind a conveyance of more acres
than he had intended.7 It developed that prior to the conveyance
he had assisted in making a survey of the land and easily could
have ascertained the results. It was held that this neglect pre-
vented his recovery.
Similar facts were present in a recent case which reached the
same result." Defendant's agent innocently misrepresented to
plaintiff the extent of the boundaries of some lots in Denver.
Plaintiff made his own measurement of the frontage on the prop-
erty, but neglected to measure the depth which had been misrepre-
sented. The court held that this negligence was a defense to a
suit for rescission brought after he had acquired the property.
Comparison of that case with the instant case reveals that on
similar facts, but on different theories, opposite results were
reached. This fact prompts a comparison between the two theories
-one in contract, the other in tort.
Negligence is almost uniformly held to be a defense against
misrepresentation, and under certain circumstances, such as where
the means of knowledge is equally available to both parties, it is a
defense to deceit.9 For an action based upon misrepresentation
the plaintiff must prove that he relied upon the falsehood. It is
also essential that the plaintiff be justified in so relying, and it is
on this basis that negligence is held to be a defense.
Turning to an examination of the cases on mutual mistake,
it is discovered that while there is much language in the decisions
to the effect that "one must bear the consequences of his own folly"'10
the courts are becoming less insistent upon this maxim." But
where special circumstances exist such as a failure to take ad-
'Wier v. Johns, 14 Colo. 493, 24 P. 262 (1890).
'Taylor v. Arneill, 129 Colo. 185, 268 P. 2d 695 (1954); noted in 27 Rocky
Mtn. L. Rev., Dec., 1954, p. 115.
'Hanks v. McNeil Corp., 114 Colo. 478, 168 P. 2d 256 (1946); Pestal v. O'Don-
nell, 81 Colo. 202, 254 P. 2d 764 (1927); Troutman v. Stiles, 84 Colo. 597, 290 P.
281 (1930) ; Slide Mines v. Denver Equipment Co., 112 Colo. 285, 148 P. 2d 1009
(1944); Bosick v. Youngblood, 95 Colo. 532, 371 P. 2d 1119 (1934); Emerson-
Brantingham Co. v. Wood, 63 Colo. 130, 165 P. 263 (1917); Jasper v. Bicknell,
62 Colo. 318, 162 P. 144 (1916) ; Sellar v. Clelland, 2 Colo. 532 (1875) ; 2 Pome-
roy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.) sec. 893. But cf. Pattridge v. Youmans,
107 Colo. 122, 109 P. 2d 646 (1941).
"Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55 (1876); Roller v. California Pacific Title
Ins. Co., 206 P. 2d 694; Muchow v. Central City Gold Mines Co., 100 Colo. 58,
65 P. 2d 702 (1937).
11 Corbin on Contracts, sec. 606.
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vantage of a readily accessible means of knowledge, 12 failure to
carry forward an investigation which had been commenced, or a
situation in which the parties could no longer be restored to the
status quo,13 negligence is still a valid defense. Thus it would seem
that in tort actions where some degree of culpability is usually
involved, the negligence of the plaintiff is more often successful
as a defense than in actions for mutual mistake where the defen-
dant's good faith is assumed. This marvelous anomaly deserves
further study.
At any rate, in the instant case strong equities urge the
adoption of the trial court's findings. Where the means of ascer-
taining the truth was readily at hand, plaintiff commenced an
investigation. The trial court found that he failed to carry it
through with reasonable diligence. Since the mortgage had been
foreclosed, the parties could no longer be restored to the status quo.
A judgment for damages resulted against a defendant who had
been acting in good faith in favor of a negligent plaintiff. The
Court easily could have arrived at a more desirable result had it
applied Rule 15(b).
WILLIAM E. KENWORTHY.
"Muchow v. Central City Gold Mines, sitpra; Eitel v. Alford, 127 Colo. 341,
257 P. 2d 955 (1953).
Grymes v. Sanders, sitpra; Corbin on Contracts, silpra.
Notes from the Secretary
(Continued from Page 372)
CANON 8. ADVISING UPON THE MERITS OF A CLIENT'S CAUSE
A lawyer should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his
client's cause before advising thereon, and he is bound to give a
candid opinion of the merits and probable result of pending or
contemplated litigation. The miscarriages to which justice is sub-
ject, by reason of surprises and disappointments in evidence and
witnesses, and through mistakes of juries and errors of Courts,
even though only occasional, admonish lawyers to beware of bold
and confident assurances to clients, especially where the employ-
ment may depend upon such assurance. Whenever the controversy
will admit of fair adjustment, the client should be advised to avoid
or to end the litigation.
OPINION 82-A lawyer may bring an action for divorce when neces-
sary grounds exist irrespective of the underlying cause; and he may
advise against reconciliation if he believes it to be against the best
interests of his client.
CANON 9. NEGOTIATIONS WITH OPPOSITE PARTY
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the sub-
ject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon
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the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to
mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not un-
dertake to advise him as to the law.
OPINION 58-It is improper for a lawyer to confer with the adverse
party for the purpose of securing an agreement to a divorce.
OPINION 108-It is improper to interview an adverse party who is
represented by counsel, in the absence of such counsel.
OPINION 124--A lawyer may not negotiate a settlement with the ad-
verse party without the knowledge of the adverse counsel.
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